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I show within a two-period overlapping generations model with income tax evasion that when the penalty rate set by 
the government is su¢ ciently small, it is theoretically possible for the capital stock to exceed the golden-rule level on 
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evasion detection is nil. 
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     1 Introduction
It is well-known from the standard overlapping-generations (OLG) model ￿ la Diamond (1965)
that there exists a possibility of capital overaccumulation in a decentralized perfectly competitive
market economy. That is, the capital stock on the balanced growth path might exceed the golden-
rule level, re￿ecting the equilibrium which is Pareto-dominated. The reason for such a dynamic
inef￿ciency is that OLG models imply an in￿nite number of households, as generations continually
enter and exit the model upon birth and death. The in￿nity of generations is precisely what violates
the conditions of the welfare theorems, implying that a benevolent social planner can improve upon
the performance of the competitive market if the latter chooses to hold too much capital.
There is a rich set of theoretical literature which deals with the problem of capital overac-
cumulation in various forms of Diamond’s framework.1 Empirical studies concerning modern
economies (many of which maintain historically small savings rate) ￿nd that the problem of capi-
tal overaccumulation is likely to be irrelevant (see, e.g., Abel et al. 1989).
In this note I consider the standard Diamond economy with income tax evasion phenomenon in
an attempt to outline some additional conditions which might cause the equilibrium capital stock
exceed the golden-rule level in a decentralized environment. The importance of analyzing income
tax evasion behavior arises from the fact that it is a chronic problem pertinent to virtually every
economy,2 albeit lesser developed economies are the ones where tax noncompliance tends to get
more serious (see, e.g., Alm et al. 1993, Chen 2003, Gupta 2004). Often many of those countries
also happen to display less ef￿cient compliance enforcement, and the public sector with more cor-
rupt tax collectors, who are prone to turn a blind eye on tax evasion (possibly for some reward).
An important question, which to the best of my knowledge has not been yet addressed, whether
a widespread tax evasion caused by a weak enforcement mechanism is capable of generating too
much ill-gotten capital, exceeding the golden-rule level. I show in this study that the answer is
yes, in principle. However, if the weak enforcement is the reason to blame, then the only suf￿cient
condition for dynamic inef￿ciency is a small enough penalty rate imposed on the taxes concealed,
not a low success rate of the audit process per se. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that an
extreme weakness of the enforcement parameters alone is still unlikely to cause capital overaccu-
mulation in the economy with tax noncompliance as that would require everyone in the economy
to report negative wages, and such a blatant dishonesty is unrealistic at least at the aggregate. Con-
sequently, a small value of capital’s share in total value added remains as the only viable cause of
dynamic inef￿ciency (which is a standard result in an OLG environment with constant returns to
scale (CRS) technology and logarithmic preferences). With that said, I now turn to the model.
2 The model
Time is discrete an indexed by t 2 [0;+1).3 Economy begins at t = 0 with initial predetermined
conditions. Economic agents live for two periods. In the ￿rst period, while young, the agents
1See Decreuse and Thibault (2001), GutiØrrez (2008) and many references therein.
2Refer, for instance, to Slemrod (2007) for a review of the problem in the context of the U.S. economy.
3For alternative or similar two-period tax evasion setups refer, for example, to Sengupta’s (1998) model with
capital income taxation only, or to CaballØ and PanadØs (2000) model with no population or technology growth but
with productive government.
1supply labor inelastically and earn corresponding wages. They optimally decide how much of
their ￿rst-period earnings to consume, and how much to reveal to the tax collector. Wage earnings
are taxed at a ￿at rate ￿ 2 (0;1). In the ￿rst period a fraction of taxpayers is caught cheating and
consequently ￿ned, and the remaining fraction escapes the audit. The agents’ remaining savings
￿nance the retirement consumption in the second period. For simplicity, I rule out any capital
income taxes.
People’s preferences are represented by the von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility func-
tion, which is time additively separable in consumption. The taxpayer’s problem is to
Max
fc1t;x1tg


















1+￿ is the psychological discount factor and ￿ > 0. Utility function, u(￿), is strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave, and twice-continuously differentiable. The amount of wages reported
to the government is x1t. Consumption of the agent when young in period t is c1t, and that of the
agent when old in the next period is c2t+1. Superscripts "c" and "nc" in the second-period denote
the consumption of a caught and not-caught agent, respectively. The probability of detection and
punishment is q 2 (0;1). If the agent is caught cheating, he faces a ￿ne rate, ￿ > 1, which will be
imposed on the amount of concealed tax liabilities, as in most countries.
On the production side of the economy there is a competitive producer with CRS production
function re￿ecting Harrod-neutral technological progress: F(Kt;AtLt), with At describing the
effectiveness of labor (Lt). The aggregate capital stock at time t is Kt. It is assumed At+1 =
(1 + g)At and Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt 8t 2 [0;+1), and g > 0, n > 0. The production function in the
intensiveformcanbestatedasf(kt), wherekt ￿ Kt
AtLt, andf isstrictlyincreasing, strictlyconcave,
and twice-continuously differentiable. The Inada conditions are satis￿ed: lim
kt!0




Let w1t stand for the labor’s wage per unit of effective worker. Assuming factor demands are
determined by marginal principles, it is simple to show that w1t = f(kt) ￿ ktf0(kt). Similarly, the
gross rate of return on capital (net of depreciation, ￿ 2 [0;1]), Rt, can be presented as f0(kt)+1￿￿.
Therefore, the household’s budget constraints can be fully described as
c
c




2t+1 = Rt+1 (w1tAt ￿ ￿x1t ￿ c1t): (3)
By specifying the functional forms, it is possible now to fully solve the model analytically.
2.1 Solving the model
Assume a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility and Cobb-Douglas technology. To obtain
the analytical solutions, I set the coef￿cient of relative risk aversion to unity.4 Production function
4Setting the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption close to 1 is consistent with the large body of
micro studies (see Attanasio 1999).
2is F(Kt;AtLt) = K￿
t (AtLt)
1￿￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the share of the capital. The intensive
production function becomes then f(kt) = k￿
t .
Marginal relations on the production side of the economy lead to






t + 1 ￿ ￿: (5)
It is straightforward to show (see Appendix) that the taxpayer’s maximization (1) with (2) and
(3) leads to
c1t =





￿￿(2 ￿ q) + ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) + q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿(2 + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
w1tAt: (7)
To ensure an interior solution for evasion it is necessary that q￿ < 1 holds, which precisely is
Yitzhaki’s (1974) condition. This can easily be deduced from (7) by requiring the numerator of
x1t=w1tAt be less than the denominator.
Now, to fully describe the equilibrium state of the economy in terms of the capital per unit of
effective worker, it is useful to state the following proposition.




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2q + q2￿)




and is positive, unique and globally stable as long as some evasion takes place.










t = Ltq (w1tAt ￿ ￿x1t ￿ ￿￿(w1tAt ￿ x1t) ￿ c1t): (10)






t = Kt+1 =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2q + q2￿)
(￿ ￿ 1)(2 + ￿)
Ltw1tAt: (11)
At the steady state
Kt+1
At+1Lt+1 ￿ kt+1 = kt = k￿, which, recalling (4) and using (11), uniquely results
in (8).
Now, note (8) is positive if 1 ￿ 2q + q2￿ > 0. The latter is equivalent to q (2 ￿ q￿) < 1. Since
for some tax evasion to take place q￿ must be less than 1, it is clear that the left hand-side of the
latter inequality is always positive. The question is whether it can be at least 1. For it to equal 1,
there must be some feasible range for q such that q2￿ ￿ 2q + 1 = 0 8￿ > 1, which is not possible.
3To ensure that the monotonic function q (2 ￿ q￿) < 1 8q 2 (0;1) and ￿ > 1 it is suf￿cient now to
show that lim
q!0[q (2 ￿ q￿)] < 1, which is indeed true.
Finally, the suf￿cient conditions for the capital stock on the balanced growth path to exceed
the golden-rule level in the economy with income tax evasion is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If the penalty rate, ￿, and/or capital’s share, ￿, are suf￿ciently small, the economy
with income tax evasion will be dynamically inef￿cient. However, a small enough value of ￿ would
violate a condition for an interior solution.
Proof. In an economy with positive depreciation, technological and population growth, the golden-
rule equilibrium capital stock is de￿ned by f0(k￿
GR) = n + g + ￿. Using f(kt) = k￿





￿(￿ ￿ 1)(2 + ￿)(1 + n)(1 + g)





f0(k￿) = 0 < f0(k￿
GR). This implies k￿ > k￿
GR as ￿ ! 0 and/or ￿ ! 1.
However, note from the numerator of (7) that lim
￿!1
[￿￿(2 ￿ q) + ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) + q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1] =
￿1 + q + ￿ ￿ q￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ q) < 0, which would violate x1t=w1tAt > 0.5
An important implication of the latter proposition is that even if the likelihood of getting caught
cheating is extremely small in the economy with tax noncompliance (meaning that many taxpayers
will successfully multiply their ill-gotten savings since as can be seen from (12) [1 ￿ 2q + q2￿]
0
q =
￿2 + 2q￿ < 0 as q￿ < 1), this alone does not necessarily lead to the capital overaccumulation.
On the other hand, even if the likelihood of getting caught is high (causing little incentives to
evade), but the surcharge rate imposed on the top of hidden taxes is still small enough (or almost
never enforced due to a variety of institutional reasons), the economy’s capital stock on the bal-
anced growth path will exceed the golden-rule level. However, a low enough value of the ￿ne
rate would mean that everyone in the economy reports negative wages (and thus gets subsidized
by the government), which is not a viable scenario. That is, as long as in the economy even with
an extremely rampant tax evasion at least some positive income declaration takes place due to the
￿nes paid when detected, the capital is unlikely to rise beyond the golden-rule level.
3 Conclusion
I have considered a standard OLG model with income tax evasion to show that there is an addi-
tional suf￿cient condition for the dynamic inef￿ciency. Namely, a suf￿ciently small value of the
￿ne rate imposed on the amount of concealed tax liability is capable of causing the economy to
overaccumulate the capital. On the other side of the enforcement mechanism, the success rate of
the tax audit plays little or no role in driving the economy to a Pareto-dominated level of the capital
stock. However, since a small enough ￿ne rate would violate one of the conditions for an interior
solution, such a scenario can be ruled out as unrealistic.
5When ￿ ! 1, the numerator of (7) approaches a negative value faster than the denominator of (7) approaches
zero.
4Appendix
Assuming logarithmic preferences, problem (1) with (2) and (3) generates the following ￿rst-





















q (￿ ￿ 1)
w1tAt ￿ ￿x1t ￿ ￿￿(w1tAt ￿ x1t) ￿ c1t
+
q
w1tAt ￿ ￿x1t ￿ ￿￿(w1tAt ￿ x1t) ￿ c1t
=
q￿
w1tAt ￿ ￿x1t ￿ ￿￿(w1tAt ￿ x1t) ￿ c1t
: (A.2)
Using the very ￿rst and the very last term in (A.2), cross-multiplying and collecting terms,
leads to
(q￿ + 1 + ￿)c1t + ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x1t = (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)w1tAt: (A.3)
Similarly, we can restate the second equation in (A.1) as
(q￿ ￿ 1)c1t + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)x1t = (q￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ ￿ 1)w1tAt: (A.4)
Hence, we have the new linear system of equations:
￿
(q￿ + 1 + ￿)c1t + ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)x1t = (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)w1tAt






q￿ + 1 + ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)w1tAt ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(q￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ ￿ 1)w1tAt ￿(￿ ￿ 1)




q￿ + 1 + ￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)w1tAt
q￿ ￿ 1 (q￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ ￿ 1)w1tAt
￿
￿ ￿ ￿; (A.8)
apply Cramer’s rule and con￿rm that indeed jB1j=jBj and jB2j=jBj result in (6) and (7), respec-
tively.
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